Category Archives: statutory interpretation

Pure PTSD claims and the decision in Pel-Air: a body blow for plaintiffs

Whilst I realise that for most members of the public a juicy set of facts is far more compelling than even the most irresistibly cogent legal precept, I am often disappointed by the scarcity of legal context given in news stories these days. I did however come across one the other day that had enough of both to pique my interest.

 

It involves a man who has sued an airline alleging that he found the tip of a hypodermic needle in his inflight meal of butter chicken with cauli pea masala. The man alleges that he only discovered the needle once it was inside his mouth.

 

The story immediately brought to mind the quintessential and if true, makes the escargot in Donoghue seem like a delicacy by comparison.

 

Based on what was reported, it would seem that whilst the man may have sustained some physical injuries to the inside of his mouth, the focus of his damages claim will be in respect of alleged depression and post-traumatic stress.

 

The interesting bit of law came from a quote of what the man’s solicitor said, which was to the effect that the plaintiff is seeking damages under the Australian Consumer Law (ACL) and the Civil Aviation (Carrier’s Liability) Act, which for ease of reference I’ll give the somewhat unfortunate acronym of CACLA.

 

Negligence actions framed as a breach of the ACL provide a useful means of circumventing the various liability hurdles and damages caps contained in the Civil Liability Act 2002 and its cognate provisions in other states (cf: Nair-Smith v Perisher). For this reason, it has become a common cause of action where a contractual relationship exists between the relevant parties such as there would have been here.

 

Though not specified in the article, the implied term of due skill and care may be the go-to, or with respect to the supplier sub-contracted to prepare the meal (ie. the “manufacturer”, as defined in the ACL), which the article reports has also been sued, a breach of the statutory obligation to supply safe and/or merchantable goods.

 

There is a defence to that latter action if the manufacturer can show the alleged defect wasn’t there at the time of supply. The airline’s claim, also referred to in the article, that the meal went through a metal detector twice before it made it onto the plane may well assist both it and the supplier in this regard. Similar issues arose in a case called Effem Foods v Nicholls [2004] NSWCA 332 where a consumer was injured by a safety pin concealed within a chocolate bar.

 

The article’s lack of detail regarding that aspect of the claim (there’s that problem again) deems any further comment on this part of the claim otiose (such a judge’s word that I feel a little bit of an imposter in using it). But it’s the CACLA part of the claim that interested me more anyway. CACLA is applicable where a person sustains “bodily injury” whilst on an aircraft or during the course of embarking or disembarking.

 

It was no doubt a particularly appealing basis upon which to claim in the context of these facts because CACLA imposes strict liability, thereby removing the need for the claimant to prove negligence to complete his cause of action.

 

However, if a plaintiff claims for pure psychiatric injuries under CACLA, a decision of the NSW Court of Appeal handed down in March 2017 has now made things more difficult. In Pel-Air Aviation Pty Ltd v Casey [2017] NSWCA 32 the Court was asked to deal with the question of whether PTSD is a “bodily injury” as that term is understood by CACLA.

 

At this point I should say that the decision may also prove to be of some moment in the interpretation of other statutes incorporating those words, of which there are a few. Section 25 of the Companion Animals Act 1998 (NSW), which deals with the (strict) liability of dog owners for injuries caused by their pooches, is one that immediately comes to mind.

 

The plaintiff in Pel-Air was a passenger in a small plane that the pilot was forced to ‘ditch’ into the sea off Norfolk island due to bad weather. As a result, she spent about 90 minutes in the water, suffering multiple injuries including PTSD.

 

It is accepted law that where a physical injury and psychological injury are connected, this kind of psychiatric injury will meet the “bodily injury” requirement. Some of the plaintiff’s psychiatric injuries in Pel-Air fell into this category. However, for what is often termed “pure” psychiatric injury, such as the PTSD suffered by the plaintiff in Pel-Air something more would be required.

 

Nevertheless, at first instance, Justice Schmidt of the NSW Supreme Court determined that given the plaintiff’s PTSD had resulted in ongoing dysfunction that was “consistent with chemical changes in her brain and body and alterations in her brain’s neurotransmitter pathways, which [had] prevented a return to normal brain function”, this was enough for it to be properly categorised as a “bodily injury”.

 

On appeal, Justice Macfarlan (with whom Justices Ward and Gleeson agreed) undertook a detailed analysis of the evidence provided by the experts commissioned by each party and in particular, the joint document produced by them after they had ‘conclaved’, which read (quoted at judgment [21]):

 

“There is meta-analytic research evidence to suggest that in some persons suffering from PTSD or Generalised Anxiety Disorder can suffer from physical changes to specific areas on the brain [sic], [eg.] shrinkage of the hippocampus…[or] changes to the prefrontal areas of the brain… [However], the experts agree that there is no evidence available to them (i.e. imaging) that will prove that the plaintiff has structural changes to her brain.” [emphasis added]

 

His Honour then undertook an interesting review of the case authorities in the United Kingdom, the United States and Canada on the point, which were all highly relevant given that their legislation, in the same way as CACLA, includes the words “bodily injury”, as a result of them all having incorporating the unifying Montreal Convention into their domestic law.

 

Consistent with those authorities, the Court found that something more than malfunctioning or chemical change must to be shown for a claim to be made out in respect of pure psychiatric injury under CACLA. For example, structural or what his Honour referred to as “actual physical damage” (at [47]). It seems that a plaintiff alleging pure psychiatric injury under CACLA will now need brain imaging showing a change in brain architecture in order to succeed.

 

Excuse the pun, but to me this would seem like a bit of a body blow to what might otherwise be a rather straightforward statutory claim.

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Common Sense prevails in Cunneen v ICAC

The High Court’s recent decision in Cunneen v ICAC [2014] HCA 14 provides an interesting case study on the current state of statutory interpretation in our courts. In narrowing the definition of conduct a private citizen must engage in to enliven the Commission’s considerable investigative reach, the High Court settled on ‘relative consistency’ over ‘absolute validity’ (at [35]) in its effort to interpret the ICAC Act.

Striving for “harmony” in its task, the Court struggled to make the various provisions of the Act sing. After all, its cumbersome provisions mean it’s no Melba. But in the end, what the Court really settled upon was plain old common sense, which is always the most appealing interpretation of all.

The starting point for the Court was its often applied decision in Project Blue Sky Inc v Australian Broadcasting Authority (1998) 194 CLR 355, which has now become somewhat the doyenne of statutory interpretation. The logic of the broad proposition stated in Blue Sky is largely self- evident:

“The primary object of statutory construction is to construe the relevant provisions so that it is consistent with the language and purpose of all the provisions of the statute.”

In its application is where the artistry arises.

The HCA was tasked with determining the meaning of “corrupt conduct” by a private individual as defined by sub-section 8(2) of the ICAC Act. The Court did this by breaking the quite cumbersome section into 2 limbs (at [7]), being conduct:

(i) “that could adversely affect” the exercise of official functions by a public official; and
(ii) “and which involves” any of the matters listed in sub-parts (a) to (y) (eg. bribery, fraud, theft and in what was the allegation ICAC wanted to investigate in this case, perverting the course of justice).

The words “adversely affect” were the point of divergence for the NSW Chief Justice and a majority of Ward and Basten JJ in the NSW Court of Appeal. Bathhurst CJ chose to give the words a more expansive definition that contemplated as corrupt any behaviour that “limits or prevents the proper performance of a public official’s function” ([2014] NSWCA 421 at [29]. This is what the High Court neatly termed the “efficacy” interpretation.

That is, such an interpretation would mean that any conduct which could affect the efficacy of the performance of a public official’s function would, for the purposes of the ICAC Act, be deemed corrupt; and thereby enliven its vast investigative powers.

However, once a light is shone upon the consequences of giving these words such a broad meaning and a few examples given, the undesirability is clear. In making this point the Court took the “efficacy” approach to its extreme (at [52]):

“… If a thief stole one of a public authority’s vehicles – say a garbage truck – the theft would qualify as corrupt conduct under s8(2)(f) because, having lost the use of the truck, the authority could be rendered less able to discharge its official function of collecting garbage.”

By choosing such a crude example, the High Court makes a strident remark.

The alternative interpretation, being the one both the majority of the NSW Court of Appeal and High Court settled upon, is the “probity” interpretation. That is, conduct of a private individual could only be corrupt for the purposes the ICAC Act if it could “adversely affect” the probity of the performance of a public official’s duties.

The Court found that the “probity” interpretation is more harmonious with the manner in which corrupt conduct is defined in sub-section 8(1), which limits the definition of “corrupt conduct’ to that which could “adversely affect” the honesty, impartiality or integrity of the public official. Therefore, in line with the objectives of “harmony” and “unity” of statutory interpretation espoused in Project Blue Sky, the Court found that the legislature is unlikely to have intended the reach of subsection 8(2) to go beyond the limits of sub-section 8(1).

Having satisfied the formal requirements of the interpretative task, the Court then said (at [53]):

“It is not likely that an Act which is avowedly directed to investigating, exposing and preventing corruption affecting public authorities – and for which the justification for the conferral of extraordinary powers on ICAC was said to be the difficulty of discovering and exposing corruption in the nature of a consensual crime of which there is no obvious victim willing to complain – should have the purpose or effect of extending the reach of ICAC to a broad array of crimes having nothing to do with corruption in public administration apart from such direct or indirect effect as they might conceivably have upon the efficaciousness of the honest and impartial exercise of official functions by public officials.”

Clearly common sense is at the heart of the Court’s judgment.

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