Late service of evidence: how late is too late?

More often than I would like, as junior counsel I am forced to seek the court’s leave to have affidavits admitted into evidence at a hearing. Whether it is a failure to comply with the court’s timetable or simply a matter of patching up an aspect of the case (having been briefed very late) it is always a precarious situation to have to deal with.

Following are some arguments which may assist the reader with enlivening the sympathies of the bench when faced with the same situation.

Somewhat ambiguously the NSW UCPRs say an affidavit must be served “not later than a reasonable time before the occasion for using it arises” (UCPR r 10.2(1)). However, being a discretionary question, aside from looking at the timing of the service in relation to the hearing date, you could also argue such things as: 

i.         That the opponent would not suffer any prejudice or unfairness if the leave were granted because the evidence is simply responding to matters it has raised or includes matters that are otherwise non-contentious;

ii.         That the opponent was in a position to adequately to deal with the ‘new’ evidence prior to the trial but chose not to;

iii.         it is in the interests of justice to allow the evidence in, based upon such matters as a plausible explanation for the delay, the conduct of the opponent in the litigation to date and history of the case (including hopefully a lack of past non-compliance on your own client’s part); and

iv.         The new evidence would permit fairness to be afforded to your client by allowing the court have all relevant evidence before it so as to enable it to comprehensively rule on the issues.

If the new evidence is indispensible to one’s case, the other alternative is to seek an adjournment to enable the opponent to reply to it. This will of course attract costs consequences, something that would have to be weighed against the importance of the evidence.

A couple of decisions that provide a guidepost as to what isn’t acceptable are as follows.

Bomanite Pty Ltd v Salex Corp Aust Pty Ltd (1991) 32 FCR 379 had had a lengthy pre-trial history, there having been no fewer than 16 directions hearings over 18 months. When the Court finally allowed the matter to be listed for trial it did so on the express basis that the affidavit evidence, a number of deficiencies in which had previously been pointed out to counsel, would stand in its then existing form at the trial. The applicant later sought leave to file further affidavit evidence about 4 weeks before the trial, which both the judge at first instance and the full court on appeal rejected. 

In State Pollution Control Commission v Australian Iron & Steel Pty Ltd (No 2) (1992) 29 NSWLR 487 the Commission sought to rely on evidence served at the commencement of the trial and was also denied.

Whilst these decisions can be viewed (and probably distinguished) in light of their own facts, it is also important to remember that where the failure to file/serve evidence on time can be sheeted home to a lawyer,  courts will be reluctant to allow the mistake to be fixed via a grant of leave. Both of the appeal courts in the above cases made reference to the words of Lord Griffiths in Ketteman v Hansel Properties Ltd [1987] AC 189 at 220 (even though he was referring to a late amendment of pleadings):

 We can no longer afford to show the same indulgence towards the negligent conduct of litigation as was perhaps possible in a more leisured age. There will be cases in which justice will be better served by allowing the consequences of the negligence of the lawyers to fall upon their own heads rather than by allowing an amendment at a very late stage of the proceedings.”

Quite sobering really.

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The Abuse of “embarrassing and abuse of process”

The complaint “Your Honour, these pleadings are embarrassing and an abuse of process” is one that tends to get used quite loosely by some lawyers, particularly in lower courts. Of course these terms sound impressive and so we enjoy hurling them about, often as a veiled shorthand opinion about the prospects of an opponent’s case, or lack thereof.

However it is always worth asking, as a Supreme Court judge did to a colleague of mine the other day, “….but Mr Smith how is this an abuse of process and/or embarrassing.” In fact, at least as far an application for pleadings to be struck out for being embarrassing is concerned, the standard is quite high.

In Shelton v National Roads and Motorists Assn Ltd [2005] VSC 251 at [14] to [15] Tamberlin J said:

‘ “Embarrassment” in this context refers to a pleading that is susceptible to various meanings, or contains inconsistent allegations, or in which alternatives are confusingly intermixed, or in which irrelevant allegations are made that tend to increase expense.‘ (emphasis mine)

If pleadings do not properly define the issues it has many adverse flow on effects, such as creating unfairness by disenabling an opponent to properly prepare their case and clouding the issue of relevance in the context of discovery and admissibility of evidence.

It is these kinds of prejudice, resulting in additional wasted expense, that should be pointed to in any application to strike out pleadings for being embarrassing.

The term abuse of process is even more serious when it comes to pleadings. Ritchies Commentary on the Civil Procedure Rules at [14.28.5] describes such claims as those which are “doomed to fail” or “untenable in the known or admitted circumstances”. That is, not even at the very least arguable. This would be have to be the slim minority of cases given that s347 of the Legal Profession Act (NSW) requires a solicitor to sign off on the reasonable prospects of any claim filed.

Before filing a motion on these grounds (eg. under UCPR 14.28) it is wise to have a close read of the pleadings to see if what you really need is just a few more particulars, rather than to have part or all of it struck out. Although the latter feels good and impresses a client, it is an application upon which it is difficult to succeed without strong grounds. Where possible, courts are obliged to have all issues prosecuted in any given set of proceedings and so will give a party the opportunity to do this unless they should be denied that right, through their own ineptitude or because there simply isn’t a claim/defence at all.

Although they sound impressive the terms “abuse of process” and “embarrassing” have a quite technical meaning and should only be used with proper justification, rather than as an accusatory yet hollow rhetorical device.

NB – for an example of a pleading that does fit within these rubrics see Stephen Warne’s blog post  “How not to plead a contract”.

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The rule in…Hadley v Baxendale

This is the first in a series of “The Rule In…” postings. Judges and lawyers often use certain common law rules as a shorthand means of describing an essential legal principle. They will say something like “…well of course that would be governed by the rule in so-and-so” often referring to a case decided in the eighteen hundreds as if it was an old friend. There is a reason these cases are referred to in this way.

What is it?

A rule that determines whether or not a particular type of damages suffered as a result of a breach of contract are recoverable based on the concept of “remoteness”.

Why is it important?

The viability of litigation can often be determined by the amount of damages a party is likely to recover. Even though a party may have good prospects on the question of liability (ie- whether there was a breach of contract), the amount of total damages they can recover may be limited. For example, a large damages claim may include as a considerable proportion a claim for lost business profits resulting from the breach of contract. If the lost profits claim fails for being too remote, the litigation may end up being a waste of time, money and emotion.

The Rule

There are two limbs under either of which a party can claim losses:

  1. “in the usual course of things”: damage that would be a “not unlikely” result of a breach of the particular contract in question (eg. a contract for the supply of equipment which proves faulty causing lost profits as a result of an inability to use it); or
  2. because the defendant knew that a breach of contract would cause the plaintiff losses of the specific nature it is claiming (eg-if the plaintiff tells the defendant it will use the piece of equipment to enable it to service a new client which will double the size of its business, damages resulting from the loss of the new client’s business caused by the faulty equipment can be claimed, subject of course to any disclaimer in the supply contract).

The Case

The owners of a flour mill sued the tardy carrier of a broken crankshaft sent away for repair. The lost profits claimed were found not to be “in the usual course of things” because the carrier couldn’t have known that the lack of this piece of equipment would result in the mill being stopped. The mill may well have had a replacement crankshaft at hand.

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Filed under Civil, damages, The Rule In