High Court Decision in Strong v Woolworths – ‘probability theory’ vs common experience

 

Plaintiff personal injury lawyers are all agog over the recent High Court decision of Strong v Woolworths [2012] HCA 5. But has it really moved things much in their favour or was it simply a case of the best possible response to a difficult set of facts?

The facts themselves are straightforward: in an unfortunate accident, an amputee woman on crutches slipped on a hot chip dropped on the sidewalk of a shopping centre, which was property under the care and control of Woolworths. On the evidence, there was no way of determining when the chip had been dropped but it was agreed the accident took place at 12.30pm.

Woolworths conceded that it had no proper system of inspection in place to prevent this kind of accident, but argued that even if it did, the errant chip would not have been detected in time to prevent the accident.

This argument raised the question of causation under section 5D of the Civil Liability Act: was Woolworths’ negligence in failing to have a proper system of inspection and cleaning in place the cause of the harm suffered?

A key step in the reasoning process adopted by the majority of the High Court was to determine that a reasonable system of ‘inspection and removal’ would require intervals between checks of not more than 20 minutes.

Therefore, for Woolworths to succeed the Court would need to find that the chip was dropped after the time of the last hypothetical inspection at 12.10pm. If so, the argument holds true that the chip would not have been detected by the time of the accident at 12.30pm, regardless of whether or not there was a proper system of inspection in place.

Conversely, if the Court determined that the chip was dropped before 12.10pm the Woolworths argument would be defeated and the plaintiff would be entitled to succeed.

Given the supermarket had been open since the start of normal trading hours, the plaintiff’s counsel argued that by sheer dint of comparing the time frames involved, the chip was more likely to have been dropped in the period between 8am and 12.10pm rather than the much shorter period between 12.10 and 12.30pm.

This argument had been defeated in the NSW Court of Appeal decision by one based more upon common sense and experience than numbers. In the court below Woolworths’ counsel, Mr Maconachie QC argued that as hot chips are more likely to be eaten at lunch, and there are more people around at that time generally (among whom, there are presumably those eating hot chips), the chip was more likely to have been dropped in the period closest to lunchtime (ie- between 12.10 and 1230pm). That’s the beauty of the common law, it’s perhaps one of the last jurisdictions left where common sense and experience have a chance to have their say.

Each of these two reasoning processes (common experience vs numbers) have their difficulties but the NSW Appeal Court judges chose common experience. However, the majority of High Court overturned the Court of Appeal and went for the odds (at [38]):

 

“The probabilities favoured the conclusion that the chip was deposited in the longer period between 8am and 12.10pm and not the shorter period between 12.10pm and the time of the fall.”

 

Perhaps the High Court felt that to permit Woolworths to escape liability in the face of no proper inspection system would prevent justice being done.

In his dissenting judgment Justice Heydon took a more hardline approach – as the plaintiff hadn’t positively discharged the burden of proving her case she should lose. This seems in keeping with the requirements of section 5E of the Civil Liability which states that the plaintiff bears the onus of proof.

In other words, it was for the plaintiff to prove via the evidence that the chip was dropped before the moment at which the last hypothetical inspection prior to the accident would have taken place, and that her recourse to “probability theory” in attempting to do this was “unconvincing”. His Honour thought the plaintiff needed more than just favourable odds to make out her case.

It is rare that there will be no evidence at all before the court on a matter so crucial. Both the NSW Court of Appeal and High Court were faced with a difficult choice between what some might consider the lesser of two evils; both common sense and probabilities are an inexact means of deciding such a serious and unfortunate situation.

If there was anything more substantial in evidence the case would not have gone nearly this far, which begs the question whether the decision will be treated as one limited to its facts or whether it will see the unlikely proliferation of reasoning based on “probability theory” in our court system. Only time will tell.

 

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Standard non-parole periods: life after Muldrock

 

In Atchison v R [2012] NSWCCA 82 the NSW Court of Criminal Appeal (CCA) was asked to consider whether a trial judge had fallen into error in sentencing the offender for an offence to which a standard non-parole period applies. The trial judge’s decision was made before the High Court handed down it’s decision in Muldrock.

 

The offender was convicted of wounding with intent to cause GBH under s33(1)(a) of the Crimes Act 1900 and sentenced to nine years imprisonment with a non-parole period of six years. Under the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act, a standard non-parole period of 7 years applies to the offence.

 

In applying the principles in R v Way the trial judge found that the circumstances of the offence meant that it fell within the mid-range of objective seriousness, which he noted was “not to be any narrow band“. The judge also found that there were special circumstances for departing from that standard and ruled accordingly.

 

The complaint on appeal was that by adopting the process of the CCA in Way, which was the prevailing standard at that moment, the judge:

 

“…departed from the standard non-parole period only to the limited extent necessary to give effect to the finding of special circumstances.”

 

This was said to be a mistake because of what the High Court said in Muldrock at [25]:

“The court is not required when sentencing for a Div 1A offence to commence by asking whether there are reasons for not imposing the standard non-parole period nor to proceed to an assessment of whether the offence is within the midrange of objective seriousness.”

Blanch J (with the concurrence of Basten JA and Hall J) agreed with the applicant’s submission and found that instead, the standard non-parole period should have been placed along-side the maximum penalty and other factors, both mitigating and aggravating, before determining the appropriate sentence.

 

His Honour then undertook this process and ruled that the non-parole period of the sentence should be reduced to four years and six months.

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R v Muldrock – the High Court takes back some territory on sentencing

Last year’s High Court decision in R v Muldrock shifted the sands of judicial reasoning on standard non-parole periods considerably and represents another interesting chapter in the ongoing struggle between the legislature and judiciary on sentencing.

 

When the Carr Government introduced the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Amendment (Standard Minimum Sentencing) Bill to the Legislative Assembly in late 2008 the Opposition were calling for a strict regime of mandatory sentencing. The Bill was too soft, they shouted.

Meanwhile, leaflets were being handed out at train stations claiming “Bob Carr is tough on crime. These are our minimum sentences.”

Once again the highly complex issue of sentencing was being politicised.

 

Sections 54A to 54D

 

Eventually, the Bill that Mr Debus announced in his Second Reading Speech was “aimed at promoting consistency and transparency in sentencing” by providing a “reference point or benchmark” was passed. It became Division 1A of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999.

Sections 54A and 54B and their accompanying Table, set out a means by which a court can determine the appropriate custodial term for certain serious crimes. It does so by reference to a suggested term applicable to a hypothetical offence in the mid-range of objective seriousness. Whether a particular offence can be so categorised is to be determined by the trial judge by reference to the common law.

Should the judge think it appropriate to depart from the standard term prescribed in the Table, proper reasons should be provided for doing so by making particular reference to the aggravating and mitigating factors set out in section 21A of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999.

R v Way

Exactly how these new provisions were to be incorporated into the well-established process of instinctive synthesis in sentencing was also left unclear until the decision in NSW Court of Criminal Appeal (CCA) in R v Way [2004] NSWCCA 131.

The CCA provided some much needed guidance by saying that the sentencing court in a particular case must start by asking and answering the question “are there reasons for not imposing the standard non-parole period”. This necessarily involves an assessment of the offence in question to determine how near or far it is to the hypothetical mid-range.

However, the current High Court does not agree.

Muldrock’s Case

The appellant Mr Muldrock is a mentally retarded man convicted of various child sex offences. In sentencing him, the extent and effect of Mr Muldrock’s mental retardation was in issue. The sentencing judge prescribed a very short non-parole period, which was backdated. This approach was taken because Mr Muldrock was assessed as eligible for admission to a special care facility designed to assist offenders with similar difficulties.

This sentence was appealed and the NSW Court of Appeal found the non-parole period should have been a lengthier six years and eight months. The proceedings then found their way to the High Court.

The High Court at [31] found that the prescribed standard non-parole was much less than a starting point for a sentencing judge’s reasoning. Instead, they said it should simply be added to the variety of factors (both aggravating and mitigating) to which the judge should give consideration before determining what is an appropriate sentence.

The Status Quo is returned

On its face, it could be said that the High Court perhaps watered down the amending legislation. But as Bob Debus also pointed out in his second reading speech “a fair and just criminal system requires sentences imposed be appropriate to the offence and the offender requiring the exercise of complex judicial discretion”.

This, it would seem, is exactly what the High Court has ensured.

 

 

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