Calderbank Offers: offeree’s prospects must be considered

The NSW Court of Appeal (CofA) decision in Tati v Stonewall Hotel Pty Ltd (No 2) [2012] NSWCA 124 dealt with the issue of Calderbank offers. It shows that if a party would be giving up the right to litigate an arguable claim, rejection of an offer to compromise it may well be deemed reasonable. As a consequence, the offeror will be denied an indemnity costs order.

In Tati the offeror put an offer of compromise in the appeal proceedings on the basis that the appeal be dismissed and each party pay their own costs of both the appeal and the proceedings at first instance. The offeror had won those proceedings and therefore had a standing costs order on the ordinary basis in its favour.

In deciding the offeror’s notice of motion on costs of the appeal the CofA confirmed that the standard test for determination of whether rejection of a Calderbank offer will attract an indemnity costs order requires asking 2 questions (at [10]):

“(i) whether there was a genuine offer of compromise (emphasis mine); and

(ii) whether it was unreasonable for the offeree to reject it.”

Bathurst CJ (with whom the remainder of the Court agreed) found that to give up the costs of the first instance proceedings would have been a genuine or “real’ (at [11]) compromise on the part of the offeror.

However, His Honour also found that the offer did not confer a “significant benefit” on the offeree when compared to giving up the right to have his “undoubtedly arguable” (at [12]) appeal heard.

The decision is significant because it shows that the offeror should form a view on the offeree’s prospects when deciding how to frame a Calderbank offer.

By implication the CofA seems to be saying that the better to offeree’s prospects, the more the attractive the offer needs to be. If it is not sufficiently attractive the offeree’s rejection of it will not be sufficient grounds for making an indemnity costs application.

Of course an offer under rule 20.26 the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules (UCPR) would have provided greater certainty. However, the offer made in the appeal proceedings in this case could not have been made under that rule. Offers under the Rules must be made exclusive of costs.

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High Court decision in Aytugrul v The Queen: it’s not what you say but how you say it

The recent High Court decision in Aytugrul v The Queen [2012] HCA 15 raised an interesting question as to whether the manner in which statistical expert DNA evidence is presented can have such a prejudicial or misleading effect so as to render it inadmissible.

The accused was being tried for murder. A hair found under the deceased’s thumbnail underwent DNA testing. Expert evidence of the testing was given at trial which included a finding that “99.9 per cent of the population could not have [the same DNA profile as the accused]”.

The accused was found guilty and appealed on the basis that, among other things, the above evidence should have been found inadmissible under section 135/137 of the Evidence Act, its prejudicial effect or tendency to mislead or confuse outweighing its probative value.

In the NSW Court of Criminal Appeal (CCA) McClellan CJ dissenting said the evidence raised questions of “intelligibility” and “juror comprehension”.

There was no expert psychological evidence dealing with these kinds of matters before the Court, but His Honour made reference to a number of published articles and appeared satisfied that they were sufficient to warrant a finding that the evidence should be rejected.

Even though unsuccessful on appeal to the CCA,  perhaps buoyed by the Chief Judge’s dissenting opinion, the accused appealed to the High Court.

The plurality in the High Court found that in the absence of these kinds of matters being taken on judicial notice by the court, for which there was no proper basis, there was no sufficient reason for refusing to admit the opinion into evidence.

It begs the question as to what might have happened if the defendant had led expert evidence of the psychological effect statistics can have on people (jurors) if presented it a certain way.

Given the increasing prevalence of DNA evidence in criminal trials it may not be too long until the question is looked at again and an expert is called to opine on the kinds of matters by which the NSW Chief Judge at Common Law was persuaded.

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