Getting to know the ‘Reasonable Public Authority’

 

In Curtis v Harden Shire Council [2014] NSWCA 314, Basten JA of the NSW Court of Appeal undertook the difficult (and much needed) task of a comprehensive interpretation of section 43A of the Civil Liability Act 2002. The section is applicable in negligence actions brought against a public authority (eg. the Crown or a local council) where the complaint involves its exercise of a ‘special statutory power’, ie. something the authority has power to do that other ordinary folk do not.

 

The facts in Curtis involved the exercise of a fairly common ‘special statutory power’, the installation of traffic signs. In performing road works, Harden Shire Council had covered the surface in a layer of loose gravel. A woman lost control of her vehicle whilst driving on the road in question and fatally collided with a tree.

 

Proceedings were brought by her de facto partner for negligence on the part of the council for failing to erect either a reduce speed sign or a slippery road sign. The council defended this allegation on the basis that section 43A provided it with a complete defence. Section 43A states that Council would not be liable unless its failure to exercise the power to erect the signs was:

 

…so unreasonable that no authority having the special statutory power in question could properly consider the act or omission to be a reasonable exercise of, or failure to exercise, its power.

 

This kind of language is familiar to most lawyers not only for its turgidity but also because it echoes perhaps the most well-known of all administrative law concepts, Wednesbury unreasonableness.

 

With its awkward wording, section 43A (as does the Wednesbury standard) appears to set the standard of reasonableness at an indeterminately high level. However by more clearly defining how the test should operate in practice, Curtis goes some way towards demystifying the metes and bounds of the section.

 

Assuming it owes a duty of care, Curtis says there is a range of reasonable responses an authority in the defendant’s position should provide in order to be deemed to have acted reasonably. Whether the response in the particular matter at hand is within that range is not simply an evaluative determination the judge conducts on the face of the decision itself. Instead, a closer inspection of the evidence should reflect one way or another, what a public authority having the same expertise and powers as the defendant, and acting reasonably, should have done in response to the risk which eventuated and caused the accident (see Basten JA at [277-279] with Bathurst CJ (at [6]) and Beazley P (at [224] agreeing).

 

The difference with a Wednesbury analysis is that Basten JA’s approach involves looking behind the decision making process, rather than simply looking at the reasonableness of the decision on its face (ie. the Wednesbury approach).

 

But how do we get to know who this reasonable public authority really is?

 

At trial, the plaintiff’s case included evidence from an ex-employee of Harden Shire Council who was a technical adviser within the Council at the time of the accident. He had not given a statement/affidavit and neither the plaintiff nor Council’s own expert made any reference to his evidence in their reports (or elsewhere). This makes the writer suspect his evidence took the Council by surprise.

 

The witness gave the opinion that a sign notifying a recommended speed limit or that the road was slippery should have been installed; especially since as he described it, the road was like ‘walking on marbles’. He was of course, in as good a position as anyone to give such an opinion.

 

So whilst he was not presented to the Court as an expert in the traditional fashion, the witness embodied the hypothetical ‘reasonable public authority’ and therefore greatly assisted the Appeal Court in finding that Council’s omission was outside the range of what could be considered reasonable for an authority in its position.

 

The plaintiff may have been fortunate that it had such a willing and persuasive witness at its disposal on this key issue. Litigation lawyers well know that this is often not the case.

 

Nevertheless, in the writer’s view, Basten JA’s findings dictate that future cases in which a 43A question arises will normally require opinion from a suitably qualified expert about what was a reasonable range of behaviours for an authority in the same position as the defendant. As his Honour stated at [279]:

 

…the court must view the matter through the eyes of a responsible public authority, having particular expertise and functions.

 

The Court’s decision also reinforces a critical distinction between the law’s treatment of the ‘reasonable person’ and ‘reasonable public authority’ in this area of torts.

 

PS – an interesting question around burden of proof also arises here. Once, it is established that what the authority did (or failed to do) truly involved the exercise of a “special statutory power”, s 43A says that there is no liability unless the action exceeds the elevated level of unreasonableness it prescribes. This is a matter for the plaintiff to prove even though the section raises matters that are much more exclusively within the knowledge of the authority.

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1 Comment

Filed under Civil, Civil Liability Act 43A

One response to “Getting to know the ‘Reasonable Public Authority’

  1. Locko

    Nick,
    Really interesting case for the Council’s barrister – a not unknown surprise witness.
    John

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